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Abstract 
China’s strong economic prosperity and the EU’s economic hardship due 
to the financial crisis have generated tensions and uncertainty within the 
EU-China bilateral relationship. China’s view of the EU as a strong 
economic superpower has began to crumble, while it has become more 
assertive in international affairs. The effects of the financial crisis have 
made the EU realise that it might need China more than China needs the 
EU. A shift in economic power to China’s favour within the EU-China 
interdependent economic relationship could result in the EU having less 
power and influence in its bilateral dealings with China, while China would 
be able to exert pressure on the EU for obtaining what it wants. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse what implications the financial crisis has 
posed on the EU-China interdependent economic relationship and what 
consequences this, in turn, has had on the following bilateral issues: the 
EU-China Human Rights Dialogues, the EU arms embargo on China, and 
China’s strive for Market Economy Status recognition by the EU. By 
applying theoretical instruments derived from interdependency theory, the 
overarching results show that the financial crisis has further exacerbated the 
economic power asymmetry between the EU and China to China’s favour. 
However, the effects of the financial crisis on the cases are contrasting. The 
HR Dialogues has experienced the most drastic changes, where China no 
longer has an incentive in upholding the talks with the EU. The financial 
crisis has made it expensive for the EU to uphold the arms embargo and 
keeps the EU indecisive. However, the financial crisis and the economic 
power asymmetry have, surprisingly enough, not generated any significant 
effects on the MES case. 
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1 The abbreviation HR that refers to the High Representative is throughout this paper followed by the 
surname “Ashton” to clarify its referral to the High Representative and not to human rights.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Economic globalisation advanced as a phenomenon during the 1980’s, more 
specifically, with the end of the Cold War. This was when the political condition in the 
world forum was strong and stabile enough to form the true nature of global economy 
together with the driving forces of economic and technological developments. A 
synergy of these forces opened the door to a new level of a global trading system. 
Technological progress resulted in advancement in computer and telecommunication 
systems, which in turn facilitated and increased global financial flows and became the 
starting point for MNC’s pursuance of global economic operations and strategies. This 
became the milestone for what we today call the global economic order (Gilpin 
2001:8). 
 
One of the most important consequences of the global economic advancement is the 
increased level of interdependency and cross-boarder engagement among states and 
actors. As a result bilateral relationships, trade and economic cooperation, and target 
strategies boosted, which in turn opened new doors for actors to collaborate and induce 
others to take certain measurements. An actors’ continuous prosperity began to rely 
much on cross-border activities and the level of dependency between actors became an 
important source of power.  
 
The European Union established diplomatic relations with China in 1975. Agreements 
on trade and economic cooperation followed shortly after and in 1988 the European 
Commission opened its delegation office in Beijing. The development of the EU-China 
bilateral relations has resulted in a relationship that is more interdependent than ever 
before, especially from an economic point of view. Considering the staggering increase 
of their economic interdependence, one might mainly think of it in a quantitative 
manner. Indeed, their trade levels have quadrupled within a decade (2000-2010), the 
EU has become China’s most important export market, and numerous bilateral 
governmental contacts have been established. The high level of interdependence has 
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led to closer cooperation and more interaction; however, it has also had qualitative 
implications on their relationship (Vogt 2012: 219). Today, there are more students that 
study in each other’s countries, more researchers that collaborate on different projects, 
more tourism exchanges, and more businesses that expand in each other’s markets. A 
combination of these quantitative and qualitative terms have tied the EU and China 
much closer to each other and transformed their relationship into one characterised by 
complex interdependence. Their engagement in a wide range of issues has enabled 
both actors not only to mutually benefit from their relationship, but also negotiate and 
push for the issues that they consider important. Their individual levels of power thus 
become an important aspect for achieving and satisfying their own goals and needs 
within their bilateral relations.  Traditionally, both actors have had the perception of 
each other as powerful and influential actors on the international arena; however, recent 
economic developments and impacts on the EU and China individually have caused 
power changes within their bilateral relationship.   
 
While China has experienced a strong economic growth and has become the second 
largest national economy in the world after the United States, the EU has experienced 
severe economic setbacks caused by the financial crisis. Even though the tone between 
the two actors remains cooperative and cordial, these dramatic economic changes have 
generated tensions and uncertainty within the EU-China relationship. China’s view of 
the EU as a strong economic superpower has began to crumble, while its own 
economic prosperity has made China more assertive in international affairs. The effects 
of the financial crisis have made the European leaders realise that the EU might need 
China more than China needs the EU. If it is indeed so that the economic changes 
have made the EU more dependent on China than vice versa, then there has been a 
clear displacement of power to China’s favour. The consequences of this on the 
complex interdependence relationship between the EU and China would be that the 
EU would have less power, influence and room for manoeuvre in its dealings with 
China, while China would be able to exert pressure on the EU for obtaining what it 
wants.  
 
The EU-China bilateral economic relations can be seen as an important cornerstone in 
their relationship. In the broader picture, these relations integrate other policies such as 
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security, political strategy and cultural aspects. The obstacles that occur within their 
deep economic and trade relations have thus also led to political and commercial 
tensions between the two actors (Vogt 2012: 5). This paper will, on the basis of this 
scenario, examine and analyse how the EU-China interdependent economic 
relationship has been affected by the financial crisis and what implications this has had 
on the following three bilateral areas: the EU and China’s HR Dialogues, the EU’s 
arms embargo on China, and China’s strive for Market Economy Status (MES) 
recognition by the EU. 
 
 
1.1 Research problem and aim 
 
The intertwined and extensive economic relationship between the EU and China has 
given rise to a series of theoretical debates and analyses. Within, for example, 
international political economy, there are mainly two theoretical dimensions to emanate 
from. Some analysts focus on the EU’s or China’s domestic forces and their impact on 
the relationship, while others emphasise on a more international perspective. Another 
theoretical dimension is the significance of institutional and societal factors (Frieden et 
al., 2000:17). This has resulted in a large number of recently published literatures that 
intend to conceptualise the situation from all possible angles. To immerse into this 
specific issue and to problematize something that has not yet been treated in this area 
has thus been a rather complex task to overcome.  
 
However, despite the high level of interest in the EU-China relationship, I have not yet 
encountered a study that investigates the possible effects of the financial crisis on the 
EU-China interdependent economic relationship in general and three specific bilateral 
issues. My research questions can therefore be formulated as follows:  
 
What implications has the financial crisis posed on the EU-China interdependent 
economic relationship and what consequences has this, in turn, had on the bilateral 
issues that are the HR Dialogues, the EU arms embargo on China, and China’s strive 
for MES recognition by the EU? Has there been an economic power shift between the 
two actors due to the crisis? Has the financial crisis made their bilateral relationship 
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more asymmetrical in terms of power within these three areas? Can we perhaps assume 
that these three areas have not been affected by the crisis?  
 
The research questions shall be divided into two analytical parts. The first part will deal 
with the implications of the financial crisis on the EU-China interdependent economic 
relationship to see if there has been an economic power shift between the actors due to 
the crisis. The aim is to identify the main pattern and characteristics of the financial 
crisis’ effects on the EU-China interdependent economic relationship. The second, and 
more important, section shall elaborate on the three cases to see if the crisis has made 
the EU-China bilateral relationship more asymmetrical within these cases or not. 
Naturally, one might expect that a shift in power between two actors should have some 
effects on the outcome of important bilateral issues. This is one aspect that will be 
further examined in the analysis. 
 
The three areas in the EU-China bilateral relationship that constitute the main areas of 
investigation in this paper are the EU-China HR Dialogues, the EU’s arms embargo on 
China, and China’s strive for MES recognition by the EU. I am well aware that there 
are other important areas and aspects of the EU-China relationship that could be 
included and analysed in this paper, however I have decided to solely focus on and 
conclude upon these specific areas for practical reasons2.  
 
The aim of this paper is thus to analyse if there has been a power shift in economic 
terms between the two actors due to the financial crisis, and if so, how has this been 
reflected within the three specific cases? The aim is not to make future predictions 
about their interdependent relationship. I intend to primarily illustrate how the EU and 
China’s interdependent economic relationship has developed prior to and after the 
financial crisis to target any possible power shifts and changes. My aim is to examine 
what implications these possible shifts have had on the three specific bilateral cases. 
Any change from the status quo, which in this case is the EU-China interdependent 
economic relationship prior to the crisis, is interesting to analyse. By taking a closer 
look at the development of the EU’s and China’s interdependent economic 
                                                
2 See section 2.3.1 Material and Practical Delimitation 
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relationship before and during the crisis, and by analysing these changes, could yield 
answers to my above-mentioned research questions.  
 
My ambition with this paper is to add new substance to the wide literature on the EU 
and China interdependent relationship. This thesis can therefore be perceived as a case 
study of three specific areas of interest that portray certain actions and reactions in the 
EU-China’s interdependent relationship relative to the ongoing financial crisis.  
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2. Methodology 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Methodological ambition 
 
This paper is framed as a case study of three cases and applies the method of 
structured, focused comparison. Case studies can be seen as “analysis of persons, 
events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are 
studied holistically by one or more method. The case that is the subject of the inquiry 
will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame- an object- 
within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates” 
(Thomas 2011: 513). Thus, as quoted above, I must define the class of phenomenon, 
or “universe” that is the analytical frame of the study, which in this paper is the EU-
China interdependent economic relationship. Secondly, the cases, or instances, that are 
the subjects for investigation within the class of phenomenon are the EU-China human 
rights dialogues, the EU’s arms embargo on China, and China’s strive for MES 
recognition by the EU (George, Bennett, 2005: 69).  
 
The method of structured, focused comparison is characterised by a “structured” part 
that uses a number of questions that reflect the research objective.  These questions are 
thus applied on each investigated case, which enables a comparison and cumulation of 
the findings of the cases and makes the method more “focused” (Ibid. 2005: 67). In 
line with this, I intend to apply the previously mentioned research questions (see 
section 1.1) on each of the three cases in order to facilitate the differences and 
similarities and cumulate the findings in the conclusion.  
 
Moreover, for generating greater precision in the results, I shall move down the “ladder 
of generality” as explained by George and Bennett by looking at sub-classes within the 
general phenomenon (Ibid. 2005: 77). This research paper will therefore focus on how 
the financial crisis has affected the EU-China interdependent economic relationship, to 
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see how this in turn has affected their power relations within the three specific cases. 
Furthermore, in order to make the study more defined, I shall apply the “ladder of 
generality” on the theoretical framework as well by identifying the scope conditions of 
interdependency theory. I have identified independency theory by three main 
conditions: costly effects, power and vulnerability. Since the aim of this paper is to see if 
there has been a shift in power symmetry between the EU and China within the three 
cases due to the financial crisis, I will apply these three main scope conditions of 
interdependency theory as analytical instruments for investigating the three cases. I 
therefore intend to apply the scope conditions of interdependency theory on the 
development of these three empirical cases to identify what changes that have taken 
place during the financial crisis.  
 
Interdependency theory states that an interdependent relationship seldom is perfectly 
symmetric, and that this creates sources of power and advantages for actors. My 
ambition is thus to apply this on the EU-China interdependent economic relationship 
to see if the effects of the financial crisis has shifted the economic power balance 
between the interdependent actors and if this in turn has created advantages and 
enabled new sources of influence for any actor within the three cases. Interdependency 
theory has the ability to grasp a wide scope of issues in a complex interdependency 
relationship, such as the one between the EU and China. It is a multifaceted theory that 
takes the multiple channels of contact between states and actors into account (Keohane, 
Nye 2012:21). The use of the theory is not restricted in the way that it can only be 
applied to governmental, domestic, or international relations, but it is applicable on all 
levels as it webs them together. This is an important attribute for my paper since I will 
need to include both national and transnational interests in order to conduct a viable 
analysis.  
 
Finally, it is good to note that interdependency theory is, alike other theoretical 
frameworks, an ideal type, where its limitations and possibilities allow scholars to 
further elaborate on or complement the theory. To test interdependency theory seems 
more interesting compared with the more traditional theoretical approaches since it 
provides a well-founded and more complex portrayal of reality due to its diversified 
characteristics. It is therefore a more tempting and interesting theory to use compared 
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to the more traditional theoretical approaches. These are all reasons to why I have 
decided to use and test this theory.  
 
 
2.2  Case selection 
 
The three selected cases that will be analysed in this paper are the EU-China human 
rights dialogues, the EU’s arms embargo on China, and China’s strive for MES status 
by the EU. The cases are all important, highly relevant and currently ongoing in the 
EU-China relations, and they project implications for both actors in different ways, 
which makes an analysis of the three cases interesting from an economic 
interdependence and financial crisis point of view.  
 
There are different important aspects to why I have chosen these three cases. One 
reason is because they are important issues for the EU and China respectively since 
there is a lot to win/lose for each actor depending on how the cases develop. The EU 
pushes to uphold the human rights dialogues with China while China wants the EU to 
lift the arms embargo and recognise China as a market economy. There is therefore a 
constant tug of war between the EU and China within each of these cases. This tug of 
war makes the cases extra sensitive to external events. It could naturally be assumed that 
if an external event, such as a financial crisis, affects the balance of power in the EU-
China interdependent economic relationship, it could further affect the development 
and orientation of each case. The cases can therefore be seen as sensitive since they are 
fluctuating depending on how external events affects the EU-China interdependent 
relationship and thus the balance of the tug of war between them.  
 
Moreover, it is also important to clarify that these three particular cases capture 
something interesting about one part of the EU-China interdependent economic 
relationship. However, there are other cases and other parts of the relationship that can 
complement this project and constitute a more complete and thorough picture of the 
actors’ relationship.   
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2.2.1 The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue 
 
Human rights have been a central issue in the EU-China relations and discussions are 
held both within their political dialogue pillar and through a specific Human Rights 
Dialogue that was established in 1995 on the EU’s initiative. There were initially two 
annual rounds of the HR Dialogue taking place during each EU Presidency that aimed 
to achieve concrete human rights improvements in China (EU-China HR Dialogue). 
However, China has during recent years expressed resentment about conducting the 
two talks and declined to take part in the second HR Dialogue meeting during 2010 
and 2011. Questions regarding Tibet and the condition of specific prisoners are from a 
Chinese perspective seen as a national sovereignty concern and not a concern for the 
EU or international community. The EU’s constant pressure on human rights issues is 
seen as a way to force China to implement Western values, something that China has 
historically bad experience from. However, leading human rights NGO’s believe that 
the EU is pursuing a weak human rights approach for fears of jeopardising its economic 
relations with China. These are said to be the underlying reasons to why the EU has 
failed to convince the Chinese government to uphold the two annual HR Dialogue talks 
(HRW.org).  
 
 
2.2.2 The EU’s arms embargo on China 
 
The EU has through its external relations policy urged the Chinese authorities to 
implement freedom, human rights and democratic measures for pursuing the level of 
openness that the EU requires from its partners (eeas.europa.eu/sanctions). From a 
Chinese perspective, the embargo has strategic implications on arms technology transfer 
and inhibits China from developing its military industry (euobserver.com/defence). It is 
important to note however, that the EU did not exactly define the scope of the 
embargo, leaving each member state to individually interpret it (consilium.europa.eu). 
Member states such as Britain and France have exported certain equipments and 
technologies with potential military usage to China, while other states have expressed a 
need to reconsider, or even remove, the ban (sipri.org). Several EU member states have 
begun to question the purpose and effect of an arms ban. Some proclaim that it is a 
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lose-lose concept; Despite China’s thirst for advanced European military material, the 
embargo is throwing spanners in the works for the European companies that produce 
these products in a time already characterised by economic hardship. Others argue that 
it is time to be more pragmatic about China’s human rights ambitions and stop 
expecting that China will meet the EU’s human rights aspirations any time soon.  
 
 
2.2.3 China’s strive for Market Economy Status 
 
One of China’s main objectives is to obtain MES. The first step towards this status was 
taken in 2001 with the WTO accession. A MES would both prevent Western markets 
to accuse Chinese firms for dumping goods and make China less vulnerable to 
Western protectionism (Chatham House).  
 
China’s economic transformation and growth gaining momentum in the beginning of 
the 21st century has given the EU an unparalleled trade partner with high dividends. On 
the one hand, China became the EU’s cornerstone for goods and service exports and is 
a supplier of cheap goods. The EU, on the other hand, became a vital high value export 
market and an advanced technology and investment provider (Vogt 2012:6-7). The 
mutual trade benefit for both parts has therefore given China an incentive to push the 
EU to recognise China as a market economy before 2016, which is when China 
officially receives MES by the WTO (Chatham House, DG Trade). Discussions 
between China and the EU have resulted in China’s former premier Wen Jiabao 
openly urging the EU to drop the arms embargo and offering to support the euro in 
exchange for MES (see bbc.co.uk/news, euobserver.com/economic). 
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2.3  Data collection 
 
 
2.3.1 Material and practical delimitation 
 
The material used for this thesis is taken from published books, scholarly publications 
and media reports from the Internet. Official documents, statements and press releases 
also constitute a substantial part of the material used. The reason for using various 
sources is to reflect different interpretations of the EU-China relationship. It lies in my 
interest as an author to provide a trustworthy and reliant paper for the reader, and I 
have therefore been obliged to carefully select and analyse the material before deciding 
to use it. My aim has throughout this thesis been to create a stable and credible 
fundament of information in order to deduct any possibility of using biased views and 
opinions.  
 
Furthermore, this paper will not rely on the comprehension of interviews. This decision 
has both positive and negative effects on this paper. One positive aspect of conducting 
interviews in relation to such an international topic as the EU-China interdependent 
relationship is that they can amplify the paper by adding important inputs that books 
and official documents might not be able to add. An important negative aspect of 
including interviews in such a paper is that there is a risk of biased views and inputs, 
especially when discussing sensitive matters. Thus, it is due to these risks and the 
scarcity of time that I have decided to exclude interviews from this paper.  
 
There are naturally some limitations that must be made within this topic and paper. 
The choice of only using one theoretical framework is one of these limitations, while 
another is the choice of analysing the three specific areas of interest. The negative 
aspect of the latter limitation is that the results derived from this investigation will not be 
applicable on other areas of the EU-China relationship even though one might be able 
to make certain assumptions based on the results of the analysis. However, I encourage 
further investigation on other areas within this topic. The positive aspect of the 
limitation is that it allows me to elaborate and provide an in-dept study of each of the 
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three areas rather than solely touching upon several areas in the EU-China bilateral 
relationship. The possibilities of extending this thesis are endless, both from a 
theoretical and empirical context. One could include other theoretical frameworks 
and/or analyse other aspects of the EU-China relationship. However, I have based on 
the above-mentioned reasons decided to limit this paper to include one specific 
theoretical framework and three cases within the EU-China relationship. 
 
2.4  Disposition 
 
The disposition of this paper is as follows. The following chapter outlines the 
theoretical framework and highlights the theoretical instruments used in this paper, 
namely costly effects, power and vulnerability. There is a need to outlay a relevant and 
extensive theoretical background in order to make it as comprehensive as possible for 
the reader. 
 
The empirical section will firstly provide relevant background information about the 
EU and China in order to understand how their relations have developed and how 
their dialogue is constructed. Secondly, it will discuss how the EU-China trade relations 
have developed and what threats both actors faced from a trade perspective prior to the 
financial crisis. The third part of the empirical section will describe the impact that the 
financial crisis has had on the EU and China respectively, the EU-China trade relations, 
and how it has affected the way that the EU and China view each other. The final part 
will explain how each case has developed through time and what impacts the financial 
crisis has had on them. 
 
The analysis will be divided into two parts where the first part analyses the general 
development of the EU-China interdependent economic relationship to see what 
changes that have taken place until the financial crisis in order to identify if the 
relationship has become more asymmetrical or not. The second part of the analysis is 
focused on the cases with the purpose to analyse what effects the financial crisis has 
imposed on each case. 
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The final section of the paper will entail a conclusion where the posed research 
questions are answered with the help of the analytical findings. The paper will end with 
an executive summary.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
“Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans 
are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent 
in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.” – Henry Kissinger 
 
 
In today’s globalised world, few scholars would disagree that we are living in an 
interdependent era. Economical, military, social, and ecological interdependence 
among states is a recurrent reality in our contemporary world politics (Keohane and 
Nye 2001:4). As globalisation progresses, states become more intertwined and 
dependent on their surroundings, which can be well illustrated by, for example, the 
fluctuations in the world’s stock exchange markets. A state’s economy has become 
highly dependent on its international trade and external firms’ FDI. Corporations have 
become transnational by launching production industries in other countries where 
production is more profitable and costs are low. Not only is self-sufficiency no longer 
beneficial for an actor; some claim that it has become impossible (Nowotny 2011: 101).  
By going beyond the surface appearance of interdependency and studying the reasons 
behind interdependent behaviour within the multifaceted webs of dependency between 
states and actors, one could reveal the underlying features of these ties that shape the 
relationship between two actors. Interdependency theory could therefore uncover 
interesting facts regarding two actors’ interdependent and bilateral relationships. One 
actor might be more dependent on the other, or perhaps has an external event affected 
the interdependent relationship to an actor’s favour/disfavour. Interdependence theory 
could be a useful theoretical tool for answering these types of questions. 
 
According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, interdependency theory aims to 
provide a coherent theoretical framework through complementary models for the 
political analysis of interdependence (2001:4). They mean that interdependence can be 
defined simply as mutual dependence, which in the international political arena is 
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characterised by reciprocal events among actors and/or states. Interdependent policy 
affects governmental, domestic and transnational interests and ties foreign and national 
policy together (2001:7).   
 
 
3.1 Costly effects 
 
Interdependency includes costly effects, where the effects of transactions on 
interdependence are linked to the costs of the effects. To illustrate this one could 
compare a state that has no gas or oil reserves with a state that has no luxury items such 
as exclusive cars or gold. The state without oil and gas reserves is more dependent on a 
constant import flow of these products than the state with no luxury goods, even if the 
monetary value is equivalent. Hence, interdependency includes reciprocal costly effects, 
even if the relationship is not symmetrical (2001:8).  
 
In order to use interdependency theory as a theoretical framework for analysing a given 
relationship, certain features of the theory must be clarified. According to Keohane and 
Nye, one particular criterion that will always be present in the concept of 
interdependency is cost, as explained above. Interdependence limits autonomy and it is 
not assured that the benefits of a relationship always exceeds the costs. Mutual benefit 
can therefore not be presumed when studying an interdependent relationship since it 
depends on the actors’ values and the individual nature of the relationship (Ibid.). 
 
Interdependence between actors is seldom perfectly balanced. Pure symmetry and pure 
dependence are two extreme points in which an interdependent relationship lies 
between. It is highly uncommon that an interdependent relationship is completely 
symmetrical or equally dependent. It is therefore the asymmetries that create space for 
advantages and sources of influence for actors. Actors that are in a less dependent 
position can often use the interdependent relationship as a means of power for 
bargaining on other issues.  It is therefore necessary to include the asymmetries in the 
evaluation of an interdependent relationship (2001:9). This relationship can be 
illustrated by below figure. 
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Graph 3.1.1: The dependency relationship between two actors 
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Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
The figure portrays the dependency relationship between Actor A and Actor B. Point 
(x) shows the dependency relationship as perfectly symmetrical, where Actor A and 
Actor B are mutually dependent. As previously mentioned, this situation rarely ever 
occurs. A more probable situation is point (z) or point (y). Point (z) shows a very 
uneven dependency relationship, where Actor A is much more dependent on Actor B 
than vice versa. Actor B would, in this case, have a power advantage towards Actor A 
since the dependency differences are rather extreme. This situation could arise between 
a state that has rich oil reserves and a state that has very limited, or no, reserves and 
relies on oil imports. Point (y), on the other hand, illustrates a more balanced 
dependency relationship, yet still asymmetric. In this case, Actor B is more dependent 
on Actor A, but Actor A also has a personal interest in upholding an interdependent 
relationship with Actor B. The space for Actor A’s negotiation power towards Actor B 
is therefore much more limited compared to the situation outlaid for point (z). 
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3.2 Power 
 
Interdependency and power are two concepts that go hand-in-hand and excluding one 
from the other is difficult, as seen above. Both Nowotny, and Keohane and Nye state 
that power in relation to interdependency can be thought of as an actors’ capability to 
influence another actor to do something that is against its will for a reasonable cost 
(Nowotny 2011:102, Keohane and Nye 2001:10). However, Nowotny argues that this is 
a more traditional view of power, when the use of force and threat on the non-
compliant actor was more common. The contemporary version of power is not as 
hostile as the traditional view, but rather based on the actor’s capacity to retrieve what it 
wants by offering options that others may gain from as well. Nowadays, power depends 
on a state or an actor’s position and superiority in the web of global economic 
interdependence and exchange. State/actor’s lay on different levels in the world-
economy depending on their independent abilities and resources (Nowotny 
2011:103,113). By taking this a step further, one could assume that the complex web of 
global interdependence could make the state/actor more vulnerable to external events 
that, in turn, could impact their level of power. 
 
According to Keohane and Nye there are different ways of measuring power. One 
focus could be on the actor’s actual power resources that give it a certain capability, 
while another focus could be on the patterns of outcome and the actor’s influence on 
these. This paper follows Keohane and Nye’s idea where asymmetrical 
interdependence is perceived as a source of power for one actor when considering 
power as control over resources, or the possibility to impact outcomes (Keohane and 
Nye 2001:10).  
 
 
3.3 Sensitivity and Vulnerability  
 
Sensitivity and vulnerability can be perceived as two important factors when studying 
the political structure of interdependence relationships. The dimensions of sensitivity 
and vulnerability interdependence can be explained by the level of responsiveness in a 
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policy framework. Sensitivity interdependence measures costly effects of transaction 
changes on governments and societies. It is created by interactions within a policy 
framework that is assumed to be unchanged. Vulnerability, on the other hand, assumes 
that the policy framework could be changed and is therefore a more important 
measurement when studying the power resources of actors. By assuming a change in 
one state and analysing the costs that these changes infer on another state one can 
measure the costly effects and the cost of adjusting to external change through new 
policies (Keohane and Nye 2001:10-11). Two states, x and y, that import 45 per cent of 
their oil needs can be assumed equally sensitive to a rise in oil prices. However, if state 
x discovers a domestic energy substitute to oil at a reasonable cost, while state y does 
not have such an alternative, state y would be more vulnerable than state x. Hence, 
related to interdependence, vulnerability can be measured based on the costliness and 
availability of substitute alternatives for states (Ibid.). 
 
Based on what has been explained above, we can derive the conclusion that 
measurements of asymmetrical interdependencies are useful tools when analysing 
international interdependence between states, actors, governments or MNCs. The 
levels of interdependency relationships depend on what type of interdependence 
measurement one takes. Sensitivity interdependence can be used for explaining the 
basis for political influence on changes in norms and rules within a fixed policy 
framework. However, if changed norms and rules leave an actor in a disadvantageous 
situation, that actor would most probably intend to change the rules at an acceptable 
cost. The variability interdependence is therefore a more profound measurement when 
explaining interdependent asymmetries. Disadvantageous situations can also lead to 
desperation and make the actor use military force as an attempt to amend the situation. 
However, although the use of military force dominates non-military vulnerability costs 
of pursuing alternative policies, it is much more costly to implement and thus not 
considered a usual or profitable approach (Keohane and Nye 2012:15).  
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3.4 Complex interdependence 
 
What we have seen thus far are interdependent asymmetrical relationships between 
actors and ways to measure these norms and rule asymmetries through vulnerability 
and sensitivity interdependence. However, to theoretically explain events in 
contemporary world politics, we would need to follow and apply ideal types of theories. 
These ideal types present certain conditions in order to explain events and happenings 
within, in this case, the EU and China relationship. The fundamental conditions of, for 
example, the political realist ideal type is that states are predominant and act as 
coherent units, the use of force is the most effective way of exercising power, and that 
world politics is characterised by a hierarchy of issues that is dominated by military 
security before economic and social affairs. These assumptions give an idea about how 
the ideal type of realism interprets world politics. However, the opposite of political 
realism is the ideal type of complex interdependence. It is this explanatory model of 
complex interdependence that will be followed and applied in this paper. The reason 
for using complex interdependence is because its conditions give a more accurate 
reflection on global issues such as the EU-China economic interdependence 
relationship than the more traditional explanatory models such as realism.  
 
There are three main characteristics of complex interdependence: multiple channels, 
absence of hierarchy among issues, and minor role of military force. Multiple channels 
can most simply be understood as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational 
relations. By looking at the EU-China relationship today, we can note that the decisions 
taken by multinational actors such as banks, firms, corporations and organisations affect 
the EU and China’s domestic relations, as well as their bilateral relations. These actors 
not only channel activities that are important for governments since their decisions 
transcend national boundaries, but they also makes different countries’ government 
policies more sensitive to one another. This means that foreign economic policies 
impose much greater influence and consequences for domestic economic activity than 
ever before, leaving the lines between domestic and foreign economic policies 
indistinct. The interdependent relationship between the EU and China is defined by 
company expansions from the EU to China and vice versa, FDI investments, imports 
and exports of goods and services, banking interactions, weekly high-level governmental 
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meetings and other types of multiple channels. These channels constitute the 
fundaments that further develop and strengthen the EU and China bilateral 
relationship.  
  
 By absence of hierarchy among issues is meant that the number of relevant issues for 
foreign policy have increased and become more diverse. Military security is no longer 
the superior issue on the agenda. It is instead accompanied by multiple and overlapping 
issues, where domestic and foreign policies impinge on one another. The IMF, the EC 
and the GATT are examples of consultative arrangements where foreign and domestic 
policies overlap and where multiple issues are discussed. The EU and China coincide 
in these arrangements and also conduct a series of bilateral consultations within a wide 
range of issues. The backside of an absence of issue hierarchy is that it complicates the 
formulation of a clear and comprehensible foreign policy and often imposes delays on 
the decision-making process, something that is true for the EU in its dealings with 
China (Keohane, Nye 2012:19, 21-22). China is increasingly puzzled by the EU’s lack 
of cohesion in its policies and its disability to reach an internal consensus on issues such 
as the lifting of the arms embargo (Zhimin 2012: 12).  
 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that military force is the dominant source of power 
when an actor or state needs to fight for survival. Force is an essential part of national 
power, but its practice has changed since the level of safety and interdependence among 
states has increased. This is particularly true for industrialised and pluralist countries 
that perceive force as an unimportant and dysfunctional instrument of policy for 
achieving goals. Traditionally, the fears of military attacks and threats forced states to 
develop a steady defence and military foundation. However today, the level of mutual 
influence between states and actors has diminished the fears of attacks (Keohane, Nye 
2012:23). As within the EU-China relationship, not much emphasis is placed on 
military rearmament, but rather on trading military technology and material. The EU-
China interdependent relationship is mainly characterised by bilateral trade relations, 
an arrangement that is mutually beneficial for both actors. There is thus no reason to 
include military force as a source of power when evaluating the EU-China 
interdependent relationship even if it is the dominant source of power.   
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4. Historical Contributions to China and 
Europe’s Contemporary Values 
 
 
 
 
China and the European states have both inherited strong cultural, traditional and 
religious legacies from their far-reaching historical background. At points their paths 
have crossed and left imprints on each other’s values and societies, which has to a large 
extent influenced their contemporary behaviour, mindset and relations with foreign 
actors. This section intends to illustrate how some of the most important historical 
events have shaped and characterised China and the EU’s current values to facilitate the 
understanding of their actions today.  
 
 
4.1  China: National sovereignty and security above all 
 
The legacy of China’s cultural traditions and values originate from the development of 
ancient Chinese dynasties and can be traced thousands of years back in history. Foreign 
imprints on these traditions and values have been few, which allowed them to grow 
stronger and become a foundation of the Chinese national identity. However, China 
experienced greater foreign impacts during its modern history and one of the most 
profound and long-lasting imprints were made by the Europeans during the “century of 
shame and humiliation” that took place from the 1800’s until 1949. This epoch brought 
a significant psychological and intellectual impact on China by imposing modernity and 
threatening not only Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also more 
importantly, Chinese values and traditions (Yahuda 2008: 13, 17-18). 
 
The effects of the exploitation on China by colonial powers and the loss of Chinese 
sovereignty during the shame and humiliation period have had far-reaching impacts on 
Chinese politics and nation building. National security and state sovereignty have since 
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this historical experience being listed as China’s top national interest. The founder of 
PRC, Mao Zedong, and his country leading successors Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, 
and Hu Jintao have all stressed and conveyed the priority of national sovereignty and 
security above all. All other concepts, be they human rights, democracy, or economical 
and social development, obtain a lower priority (Men 2011: 541-542). 
 
 
4.2  The EU: Counter war, peace and cooperation 
 
In contrast to China’s “shame and humiliation” period, where the Chinese had to fight 
to keep their traditional values away from external influence, the EU was enacted for 
avoiding internal wars. With the end of the Second World War, the fundamental idea 
of a European community was to build a peaceful and united Europe. By primarily 
unifying the French and British coal and steel industries that were essential for making 
war under a single authority, the ambition was to create what Robert Schuman called a 
“de facto solidarity”, which thus would make wars between the two former enemies 
“materially impossible” (Nelsen, Stubb 2003: 13). 
 
The emergence of the EU has since the signing of the ECSC treaty in 19513 been 
staggering. As a complex and interwoven sui generis actor that has a policy-making 
process that extends across the subnational, national and supranational level, it obtains 
competencies where common interests and resources are gathered to meet regional, 
national and international challenges (Algieri 2008: 65-66). The latter came with the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the establishment of the CFSP as 
the EU’s second pillar. The main purpose of the CFSP is to strengthen the EU’s role in 
international politics and it is viewed as a vital framework through which the EU 
conducts its external relations (europa.eu/legislation). 
 
Since the underlying reason for establishing the EU is to hinder the outbreak of war 
within the European boundaries, its core values are often stated to be human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights 
                                                
3 The ESCS treaty was signed on 18th April 1951 and entered into force on 25th July 1952. 
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(europa.eu/Lisbon). These values are projected through the EU’s CFSP framework, 
where especially human rights and support for democracy constitute central aspects of 
the EU’s external relations policy. These aspects pervade all external policy-making 
processes and policy implementations, and all cooperation agreements being trade, 
energy, climate, or others, contain clauses that stipulate human rights as a fundamental 
factor in relations between the EU and its partners (EEAS human rights). A breach of 
the objectives set out in the CFSP can result in the EU imposing sanctions or restrictive 
measures through trade restrictions, arms embargoes, or through other diplomatic or 
economic consequences. The purpose of these punitive instruments is to bring forth a 
change in governments’ or non-state entities’ policies or activities that violate human 
rights, international law, rule of law, or democratic principles 
(eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sactions). 
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5. Crossing Paths and Enhanced 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China in 1975, 
their relationship has undergone major transformations. While the EU has 
strengthened itself as a major actor in global affairs, China has experienced a massive 
growth in terms of economic development and international influence (Zhimin 2012: 
7). The EU has become China’s biggest trading partner, and China is by far the EU’s 
largest import source and second largest partner in two-way trading after the United 
States (ec.europa.eu/trade). Their extensive development in terms of trade indicates 
that they share common interests and enjoy mutual benefits by further fostering and 
deepening their bilateral economic cooperation (Men 2012: 333).  
 
The completion of the EU’s single market in 1992 led the EU to focus on stimulating 
the European economy by engaging in international trade relations. The dynamic 
economic transformation in China was given substantial attention, resulting in the first 
China policy paper, A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations, to be issued in 
1995. In this paper, the European Commission acknowledged China as “increasingly 
strong in both the military-political and the economic spheres” and “becoming part of 
the world security and economic system at a time of greater economic 
interdependence” (Men 2012: 334, Commission of the European Communities). For 
the EU, close engagement and development of a long-term relationship with China 
have since then been a prioritised EU policy and led to enhanced cooperation in 
economic and political areas, among others. Consequently, this resulted in a major 
increase in the number of high-level visits between China and the EU, which in turn 
made their bilateral relations more complex and profound. The advancement of their 
bilateral cooperation and relationship marked the beginning of what would be called a 
“honeymoon” period (Men 2012: 334-335). 
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5.1  The present construction of the EU-China dialogue model 
 
The present model for dialogue interactions between the EU and China can be seen as 
divided into three pillars where each pillar engages in political dialogue, economic and 
sectoral dialogue, and people-to-people dialogue. The EU conducts the dialogues 
through the presidents of the European Council and the Commission (EU-China 
dialogues). The high level of dialogue exchange between the EU and China also 
includes a human rights dialogue. Since democracy and human rights are viewed as 
central aspects of the EU’s external relations policy, the EU has undertaken several 
projects and programmes with the aim to strengthen these values in China’s rule of law 
and civil society. 
 
 
5.2  Is the honeymoon over?  
 
However, history can transmit old values to impact the contemporary mindset of states 
and actors. Based on what we have seen thus far, the EU’s and China’s separate history 
has created events that have left distinct marks on their mindsets and how they view 
issues. Both have a different hierarchical structure of values, which has led to difficulties 
in understanding each other’s opinions and given rise to deadlocks in some issues 
within the EU-China bilateral relations.  
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6. EU-China trade: a Success and Setback Story 
 
 
 
 
6.1  From the Tiananmen incident to flourishing trade  
 
The Tiananmen Square killings in Beijing in 1989 devastated much of the bilateral 
relations between the EU and China, including their initiated trade relations. It was not 
until 1995 when the EU decided to remove many of its sanctions on China that their 
trade relations began to blossom and their political and economic relations were 
intensified and deepened. Their bilateral trade developed into a relationship 
characterised by a high level of complementarity and mutual benefits and experienced a 
rapid increase from 2002-2003 and on. The EU-China trade in goods has increased by 
400% between years 2000-2010, from €101 billion (bn) to €395 bn. In the year 2000, 
the EU exported goods to China for a value of €26 bn and imported goods for €75 bn. 
In 2010, the same export and import levels of goods reached €113 bn and €282 bn 
respectively (EU-China Trade Relations 2011: 6-7).  
 
6.2  From mutual trade benefits to mutual trade concerns  
 
China’s large population is offering a broad market and cheap workforce, and its 
competitive advantage is primarily resting on labour-intensive products. Its speciality has 
mainly been exports of light industry goods with simple technological content to the 
EU. The EU, on the other hand, has developed a competitive advantage on capital-
intensive and technology-intensive products, and is mainly exporting machines, 
equipment and other high-technology products to China. This division of production 
capabilities is perceived as being the essential driving force behind the EU-China trade 
symbiosis. However, these positive views and trade progressions of the bilateral 
relationship come with a downside of concerns for both actors. The effects of China’s 
continuous rise and its internal political views on the economic relations threaten to 
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impose serious consequences on the EU in terms of trade, investments and on the EU-
China political relations (EU-China Trade Relations 2011: 6-7, Qingjiang 2012: 4-5).  
 
One of the obvious consequences of China’s economic prosperity is its production 
expansion to high-end and high value-added products. China’s production of both low 
and high value-added goods threatens to displace the mutual competitive advantage 
between the two actors and diminish the EU’s own production and exports of high 
value-added goods to China due to the formers inability to compete with China’s low 
production costs. These types of shifts have led to increased protectionism in certain 
production fields. The Chinese complain that the EU poses restrictive measures on 
exports of competitive products from developing countries to the EU, while allowing 
exports of other products that are unable to compete with their European counterparts 
(Wai 2011: 189, 193). 
 
However, it is not only China that complains on the barriers to market access and 
unfair competition. One of the prerequisites for China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 
was that it had to undertake certain WTO obligations on market rules and access. 
China has implemented many of the measures outlaid by the WTO, but according to 
the EU, it has still not opened its markets to the extent that the EU had expected (EC 
EU-China 2006: 7). The EU was hoping that the WTO accession would liberalise 
Chinese restrictions on imports and investments and thus result in removing tariffs and 
opening the Chinese market for foreign companies. However, despite China’s tariff 
reduction on certain products, barriers of trade still remain on industries that are 
particularly important for the EU (Glen, Murgo 2007: 342). These barriers cost the EU 
businesses approximately €20 bn in lost trade opportunities annually, equivalent to one-
third of the current EU exports to China. This is seen as a vital reason behind the 
growing trade deficit that the EU has vis-à-vis China (Qingjiang 2012: 16-17). 
 
 
6.3 The threats of a growing trade deficit 
 
The EU has faced a growing trade deficit in manufactured goods with China since 
1997, and the trade imbalance has more than tripled between 2000-2010. Despite an 
 34 
increasing consumer market and middle-class population in China, the EU is still 
exporting more to the 7.5 million inhabitants in Switzerland than to the 1.3 billion 
people in China (Ibid. 2012: 18).  
 
Table and Graph 6.3.1: Evolution of EU – China Trade in goods (billions of Euros) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU-China Trade Relations  
 
 
The EU’s concern with the trade imbalance is not the mere fact that it exists, but rather 
its size and continuing increase. According to a study from 2011 requested by the 
European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade on EU-China trade 
relations, a trade imbalance gives rise to an increasingly unfair level playing field for the 
EU companies in particular. While Chinese exporters increase their competitiveness 
along with China’s economic prosperity, the EU companies face market access 
difficulties, which cause an overall imbalance in the EU-China trade and economic 
interdependent relations (EU-China Trade Relations 2011: 11-12). For the EU there 
are mainly two ways of handling the trade imbalance; either by reducing Chinese 
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imports to the EU or by increasing European exports to China. While the former 
would result in protectionist reactions and culminate in Chinese irritation, the latter 
would require China to make a stronger effort to enable access to its markets. However, 
since the Chinese government asserts that market access exists, while the European 
companies argue the opposite, the conflict regarding market barriers remains 
unresolved (Qingjiang 2012: 18).  
 
The European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, mentioned some of the 
trade challenges between the EU and China during the EU-China High Level Political 
Forum in Brussels in November 2011. He stated that China’s economic rise could not 
have happened without an open global trading system. Open markets are a pre-
requisite for China’s own continuous development, and “are essentially a two-way 
street”. He said that problems concerning market access and non-discriminatory 
treatment of companies could lead to “people questioning the legitimacy and rationale 
of keeping the European market open”. Reciprocal market access is necessary in order 
to overcome the short-term trade irritants before they amount and jeopardise the long-
term economic relationship between the EU and China, according to De Gucht (EU-
China High Level Political Forum). 
 
 
6.4 The EU’s coordination weakness: A trade hindrance 
 
Another issue that is said to hamper the EU’s position and acting power towards China 
is the EU’s own lack of coordination and strong consensus in its policies. There is a 
need to refine the EU’s strategy towards China and make it more united and target-
oriented in order to face the economic opportunities and challenges that are generated 
by China’s increase in economic power and growth. The Chinese government is aware 
that the EU member states have different positions regarding market access. While 
some member states advocate greater protectionism, others push for free trade or have 
no clear position. A lack of internal consensus does not only complicate the EU’s 
efforts to achieve reciprocal market access with China. It further allows China to take 
advantage of these internal disagreements by offering individual member states bilateral 
trade opportunities in exchange for support in other economic or political issues, such 
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as granting China MES or lifting the EU’s arms embargo. The EU’s inability to create 
an internally firm position among its member states on reciprocal market access offers 
China opportunities to gain leverage against the EU by bonding with individual member 
states, which in turn dilutes the EU’s decisiveness and results in an uneven balance of 
power to China’s favour (EU-China Trade Relations 2011:11, 21-22, Glen, Murgo 
2007: 343-344). 
 
In sum, it is clear that the EU and China enjoy high levels of bilateral trading and view 
each other as important economic and trade partners. Both actors’ economic and trade 
development has undergone remarkable progress since their real initiation of bilateral 
trade relations in 1995. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 further boosted China’s 
international trade levels and created a tighter trade link between the two actors. 
However, closer economic ties has led to higher expectations on each other regarding 
the opening of markets and non-discrimination of foreign companies. They have also 
revealed the EU’s weakness in coordinating and creating a strong internal consensus for 
establishing reciprocal market access with China. The EU’s internal issues have enabled 
China to offer lucrative trade opportunities to individual member states in exchange for 
supporting China’s strive for MES or the lifting of the EU’s arms embargo. Thus the 
backsides of increasing bilateral trade relations are these types of trade obstacles and 
conflicts that remain topical and unresolved and could impose serious implications on 
the EU-China long-term bilateral trade relationship.  
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7. The Financial Crisis: A Game Changer in 
Economic Power 
 
 
 
 
The impact of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis has brought serious repercussions 
for the EU and its member states. A conjunction of the construction collapse, housing 
and real estate booms in Ireland and Spain in the end of 2007 was further amplified by 
the global economic and financial collapse and led to the most severe economic 
contraction that Europe has experienced since the 1930’s. In the end of 2008, 25 out of 
the 27 EU member states, all except Poland and Slovenia, found themselves either in a 
recession or a depression (the Baltic States). The EU’s weak reaction and resistance to 
inject an immediate and strong fiscal stimulus into the economy further exacerbated the 
situation. The EU’s inability to take drastic measures, together with the high levels of 
trade and financial interdependence among the EU states, generated a chain of negative 
effects that resulted in a sovereign debt crisis that paralysed the economy of the 
European states in early 2010 (Cameron 2012: 3-4, 91-92, 163). 
 
The effects of the global financial crisis have caused a major power-shift in the world 
economy in favour of emerging powers. While leading western powers such as the EU 
are economically weakened and suffering from economic losses and heavy debt, China 
has managed to avoid the economic crisis, pursue its rapid economic growth and 
overtake Japan position as the second largest national economy in the world during 
2010 (Zhimin 2012: 8). While the EU is focusing more on internal austerity measures 
and bailouts of its own member states, China is becoming increasingly assertive and 
establishing itself as a pivotal player in international affairs. The EU’s relative loss of 
competitiveness, weak domestic demand, increasing unemployment rates, costly public 
sector and expensive welfare systems are some of the crisis consequences that forecast a 
gloomy long-term economic performance. Chinese firms, on the other hand, are taking 
advantage of their low production prices and rapidly expanding and taking over markets 
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in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America that used to have strong European 
economic presence (Vogt 2012: 222-223).  
 
 
7.1 Increased tensions and loss of trust 
 
The challenges that the financial crisis has imposed on the EU’s economy have also 
created a number of tensions between the EU and China. China’s growing assertiveness 
in international forums has made it less eager to compromise on issues such as trade 
negotiations (EU-China Trade Relations 2011: 23). The EU must therefore devise a 
new strategy on how to come to terms with China from a weaker negotiating position 
(Vogt 2012: 221). However, maintaining good relations with the EU is a top priority for 
China. Taking into account that China’s growth heavily depends on its exports, and that 
the EU is China’s largest export market, makes it important for China to maintain and 
help to improve the EU’s financial situation. Thus the role that China has taken in the 
European sovereign debt crisis has been to invest millions of euros in infrastructure 
programmes, offering to buy European bonds and to give financial support to the 
financially vulnerable European member states (EU-China Trade Relations 2011: 23).   
However, the EU has been reluctant to accept China’s helping hand for certain reasons.  
Even if the EU and China have maintained cordial political relations and expressed 
firm commitments for strengthening their bilateral ties, the EU remains persistent on 
democracy and human rights issues in China. There is a European fear in losing 
political power in promoting these core issues if the EU would allow China to provide 
support in its internal affairs (Zhimin 2012: 14).  
 
 
7.2 In the eyes of China: Is the EU an overrated partner? 
 
There are further arguments that the European debt crisis has changed the Chinese 
perception of the EU as a global economic power. There are views that China sees the 
EU as a success story of how Europe has managed to establish itself as an economic 
superpower on equal level with the United States. Maintaining close economic 
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cooperation with the EU and its member states is therefore of vital importance for 
China’s economic growth and modernisation. However, the impacts of the financial 
crisis have resulted in Chinese observers questioning the EU’s status in the international 
economic arena. The Chinese are surprised of how the EU is transforming, from a role 
model on many fronts to a union of many problems. The Chinese elites and the 
general public have become more pessimistic about the EU as a rising power and pay 
less importance to the China-EU bilateral relationship after the EU sovereign debt crisis 
compared to before the crisis (Ibid. 2012: 12-13).  
 
Table 7.2.1: The most influential bilateral relationships as viewed by the Chinese:  
2006-2011 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
China- US 78.0 85.2 75.6 81.3 76.8 76.6 
China-Japan 48.7 48.2 35.0 21.4 29.2 21.5 
China- Russia 19.8 22.0 23.4 21.3 20.5 20.6 
China- Europe 13.2 13.6 13.6 19.9 7.3 8.0 
China- Africa 6.2 3.3 7.3 6.4 1.7 1.8 
 
Source: Zhimin 2012: 20 
Note: The survey respondents were allowed to select the two bilateral relationships that they perceived as 
the most important. The surveys were conducted on an annual basis, i.e. during four consecutive years 
(2006-2010). The figures for 2011 are provided by the source.  
 
 
The above table illustrates how the Chinese perceptions regarding China’s most 
influential bilateral relationships have changed between 2006-2011. The information is 
taken from an annual survey conducted by China’s newspaper Global Times, affiliated 
with the official newspaper People’s Daily. The table shows that the China-US bilateral 
relationship was seen as the most important relationship during the five consecutive 
years. Compared to the China-Europe bilateral relationship, it is evident that China-
Europe was perceived as much less influential. However, what is interesting about the 
China-Europe figures is the dramatic drop that the bilateral relationship had in the eyes 
of the Chinese between 2009-2010, from 19.9% down to 7.3%. Based on this 
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information, one could assume that the Chinese perception of the China-EU bilateral 
relationship as less important after 2009 could be chained to the EU’s sovereign debt 
crisis that occurred during the same period of time. Hence, the EU member states’ 
internal economic problems might have caused the Chinese to lose faith in the EU both 
as an economic superpower and as an important bilateral partner. 
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8. Cases 
 
 
 
 
8.1 The EU-China HR Dialogues 
 
 
8.1.1 How it all began 
 
The EU has since its founding Treaty of the European Union from 1993 stated that 
“democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” are viewed as an essential objective within the EU’s CFSP (Glen, Murgo 
2007: 334). As a steadfast advocate for human rights, the EU has stipulated that all 
cooperation agreements between the EU and third parties must contain a human rights 
clause where the EU reserves the right to implement punitive approaches against HR 
violations in these countries (Men 2011: 539-540). However, from Chinese perspective 
due to its historical experience, state sovereignty and national security are prioritised 
higher than human rights (Men 2011: 541).  
 
 
8.1.2 A bilateral deal becomes another actor’s frustration 
 
In line with the EU’s HR ambition, the EU-China annual HR Dialogues were 
established in 1995 on EU’s initiative for supporting China’s transition to an open 
society that respects human rights and implements the rule of law (EU-China HR 
Dialogue). For China, the EU was seen as an important and powerful trade partner that 
held many keys for China’s continuous economic growth. Thus for establishing 
stronger and closer bilateral ties with the EU, China agreed to meet some of the EU’s 
requests such as the annual HR Dialogues as a way to show the West that it is a 
responsible and serious actor on the world stage. The EU’s aim of the dialogues was to 
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influence HR developments in China through softer and more low profile means that 
respected China’s national values and dignity (Wai 2011: 206).  
 
However, despite conducting the annual bilateral HR Dialogues twice a year since 
1995, little progress has been made within the HR area. In 2006 the EU expressed its 
frustration over the results of the dialogues in the communication “EU-China: Closer 
partners, growing responsibilities”. The paper stated, “The EU’s expectations- which 
have increased in line with the quality of our partnership- are increasingly not being 
met.” (EU Communication 2006).  
 
One explanation to the HR Dialogue failure could be the EU and China’s differences 
in prioritising when it comes to human rights. The EU’s high profile commitment to 
human rights and democracy in contrast to China’s focus on economic development 
and state sovereignty has undoubtedly created cooperation difficulties within the human 
rights area and resulted in irritation on both sides. Furthermore, issues like Tibet and 
European leaders’ meetings with the Dalai Lama has generated even greater nuisances 
for China and further infected the EU-China relations. China’s irritation stems from the 
fact that it considers these issues to be a part of its national interest and that Europe 
thus interferes in China’s domestic affairs (Men 2012: 347).  
 
 
8.1.3 HR Dialogues- litmus test for the EU-China relations 
 
In 2008 the Dalai Lama quarrel would mark the beginning of a new stage in the EU-
China relationships. When the former French president Sarkozy scheduled a meeting 
with the Dalai Lama, China showed its disagreement by cancelling the 2008 summit 
meeting with the EU that had run for 11 consecutive years. This was an unprecedented 
step by China to penalise the EU for its human rights endeavours. President Sarkozy, 
who had already sidestepped an earlier meeting with the Dalai Lama the same year to 
avoid displeasing China, criticised China for intervening with his decision-making power 
as the French president and as the EU president at the time (nytimes.com, Men 2012: 
347).  
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The cancellation of the summit meeting became the starting point for China’s more 
aggressive tone towards the EU regarding issues that China perceives as strictly national 
matters. The summit was supposed to discuss the increasing Chinese trade surplus with 
the EU and issues related to the financial crisis (guardian.co.uk/dalailama). Due to the 
EU’s crisis situation and its wish to solve the trade imbalance issue, the upholding of the 
summit meeting could be seen as more beneficial for the EU than for China. The 
cancellation thus imposed consequences for the EU in a double sense; from one 
perspective China showed that it was not hesitant to implement penalising measures on 
the EU if the EU acts in a way that China perceives as “crossing the line”, and from 
another perspective China showed that it could be disobliging in discussing issues that 
are of great importance for the EU. 
 
The above mentioned is an early indication of an influential and more assertive China 
in international affairs. It became a litmus test for the EU-China relations to see how far 
China could direct the EU to follow its requests. From an EU perspective, the 
disappointment on the results of the HR Dialogues was a first realisation that things are 
not progressing in the way that the EU had wished for in the human rights area. 
Another setback was when China began to issue consequences for the entire EU due to 
actions taken by single member states. This can be regarded as a great shift in the EU-
China relationship towards a more demanding China.  
 
However, the most significant adversity in the EU-China HR Dialogues occurred in 
2010 and 2011 when China declined to take part in both years’ second sessions of the 
dialogues as a strategy to reduce the number of dialogues to once a year. This was a 
major setback for the EU member states, which despite the acknowledged HR 
Dialogue fatigue do not have any other policy towards China directed solely on human 
rights issues (Men 2012: 348). However, the biggest setback clearly struck the EU, who 
as a union has made a clear and firm commitment to promote human rights and 
democracy internationally. During the first HR Dialogue session in 2012, the EU 
expressed its disappointment to the Chinese delegation and reiterated its wish to 
uphold the dialogue twice a year (consilium.europa.eu/hrdialogues).    
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Yet, international human rights NGO’s have voiced concerns regarding the EU’s 
diminishing engagement in human rights issues in China in exchange for China’s 
involvement in an economic bailout of European member states. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the EU’s and the member states’ approach to human rights issues in 
China is weak for fear of jeopardising economic relations (hrw.org/hrec). In another 
report HRW observes that the EU only made general references to China’s human 
rights situation in its joint press communiqué of the 14th EU-China summit in 2012. 
However, the general points made by the EU were an improvement compared to the 
previous communiqué released a year before, which according to HRW did not even 
mention human rights (hrw.org/news). Amnesty International is another NGO that has 
raised concerns that “human rights might be traded away in return for Chinese 
assistance in the euro crisis” (dailymail.co.uk/amnesty). Amnesty also noted a trend in 
silencing criticism when economic relations grow, and stated that the EU’s economic 
situation will probably have an impact on how the EU handles its human rights 
discussions with China (guardian.co.uk/bailout).  
 
There is thus a common understanding among human rights organisations that 
economic deals such as bailouts will give China greater influence and leverage on the 
EU. For further enhancing this statement, there are recent reports that alert a worsening 
of the human rights situation in China. Upon HR Ashton’s first visit with the new 
Chinese leaders in Beijing in April 2013, HRW reported that the human rights 
environment is deteriorating in China and that “human rights and the rule of law have 
become mainstream topics in today’s China (…)” (hrw.org/china). 
 
The initial purpose of the Human Rights Dialogues was to promote human right values 
in China through a soft and sustainable approach. Despite the dialogue’s inability to 
reach tangible results, the real human rights’ setbacks took place with the beginning of 
the financial crisis. China went from being accommodating in its efforts to reach some 
of the human rights goals set out by the EU, to imposing consequences on the EU and 
its member states for conducting meetings with the Dalai Lama. This enormous 
contrast in behaviour has obviously strained the EU-China relationship and raised 
concerns regarding the EU’s weakening position in human rights discussions contra 
China in line with China’s bailout contribution to financially sinking EU member states. 
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China has managed to disintegrate the EU’s firm standpoint on human rights issues pari 
passu with providing financial support to its member states. However, despite this 
change in direction, the Human Rights Dialogue is still ongoing, even though question 
marks regarding its relevance persist.  
 
 
8.2 The EU’s arms embargo on China 
 
 
8.2.1 How it all began  
 
The EU’s arms embargo was introduced in 1989 after the Tiananmen incident and the 
military crackdown on Chinese students that occurred the same year. The EU’s main 
reason for implementing and maintaining the embargo has been to send China a strong 
signal of disapproval against the repressive actions and executions and of support for 
the improvement of human rights, democratic values and freedom in China (EC 
sanctions). In order to lift the arms embargo, the EU demands significant human rights 
progress in China and has previously stated that “nobody has said we [the EU] are 
going to lift our embargo for free” (Men 2011: 547). However, the imposition of the 
EU embargo has never had codification for being legally binding for member states, 
neither has a duration or verification of the embargo been specified. This general 
political declaration has allowed member states to make individual interpretations of 
the ban and the EU has permitted selected sales and transfers of military material. This 
has in turn legitimised the distribution of non-lethal military products from the member 
states to China (nti.org).  
 
 
8.2.2 Financial gains: Europe’s temptation to lift the embargo 
 
Along with China’s economic boost and transformation into a leading economic 
superpower during the beginning of the 21st century, and the EU member state’s 
stagnant growth rate since the end of 1990s, the temptation for lifting the EU arms 
 46 
embargo in order to obtain lucrative military orders became somewhat irresistible for 
certain EU member states. The main advocates for lifting the arms embargo were 
France and Germany during the EU-China “honeymoon period” in 2003-2004. 
Germany and China’s relationship is mainly characterised by strong economic ties in 
terms of trade, inward investment and technological cooperation, which in turn means 
that both actors are eager to maintain good political relations with each other. France, 
on the other hand, has sought to strengthen its relationship with China for realising 
economic gains as their German counterparts (Glen, Murgo 2007: 337). In 2003, 
President Jacques Chirac welcomed President Hu Jintao to Paris with one of the most 
extravagant receptions ever given a foreign leader by lighting up the Eiffel Tower in red 
and designating the following year 2004 as the “Year of China” (Heritage.org).  
 
During the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s visit to Beijing in 
December 2003, he told his Chinese host, Premier Wen Jiabao, that Germany was 
amenable to end the arms embargo (heritage.org). Premier Jiabao, who referred to 
Schroeder’s visit as “another family meeting” expressed wishes for a removal of the 
arms embargo and called it a product of Cold War times and not in line with the 
established partnership4 between China and the EU (china.org.cn). The former French 
President Jacques Chirac followed the same line of thought as his German colleague 
and stated during his visit to Beijing in 2004 that arms embargo is “groundless and 
illogical” and “no longer justified” (chinadaily.com, news.bbc.co.uk Chirac). His at the 
time foreign minister Dominique de Villepin stated in 2004 that the embargo “is 
outdated” and referred to Beijing as “a privileged partner of the EU and has a major 
and responsible position in the international system” (bbc.co.uk Villepin).  
 
The eagerness by the Franco-German axis to lift the arms embargo has strong 
reciprocal advantages. A lift would quench the Chinese thirst for modernising its 
military material and provide a money haven for states such as Germany and France 
that are leading in high-technological military products. It would also give China an 
ability to diversify suppliers, something that is not possible at the moment. China’s 
current suppliers of military technology, mainly Russia and the Middle East, cannot 
provide as advanced material as the European countries, but they still place China in a 
                                                
4 A Strategic partnership was established between the EU and China in 2003 
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weak bargaining position due to China’s limitation in suppliers. An EU ban removal 
would thus give China more bargaining leverage vis-à-vis its current suppliers and 
generate lower profit for Russia and the Middle Eastern countries (nti.org).  
 
However, despite the win-win situations that an arms ban removal would allegedly 
invoke on both the EU member states and China, there are different reasons to why the 
ban has still not been lifted since its implementation 24 years ago.  
 
Firstly, not all EU member states support a lifting of the ban. The Scandinavian 
member states, the Netherlands, and to some extent Portugal and Belgium have earlier 
opposed to lift the embargo without demanding significant human rights progress in 
exchange from China (nti.org, Glen, Murgo 2007: 338) During 2004 there were several 
attempts to remove the arms embargo through voting. The French foreign minister de 
Villepin’s suggestion to lift the ban at the EU foreign ministers conference in January 
2004 was voted down by 14 to 1 (Heritage.org). The European Parliament passed four 
resolutions where all supported the continuous upholding of the embargo in 2004. In 
another attempt in April 2005, the European Parliament voted 431 to 85 (31 
abstentions) in favour of a resolution that proclaimed that the EU should not remove 
the arms embargo (Men 2011: 547). This was repeated in 2008 where the European 
Parliament stressed that the EU must maintain its arms embargo on China (EP 
2007/2255).  
 
Secondly, the lifting of the embargo is not only an EU member state concern, but also a 
concern for the US. The US has been a strong opponent to lifting the EU embargo and 
considers it as complementary to its own arms ban on China (Glen, Murgo 2007: 338). 
In contrast to the European correlation between the lifting of the arms ban and 
economic gains, the US is more concerned about the strategic implications that a 
removal would signify (nti.org). The case of Taiwan is the most important problem in 
Sino-American relations. If the EU would lift the arms embargo and China, in turn, 
would make reality of its threats to declare war across the Taiwan Straits, the US would 
find itself in an open and armed conflict with a military strong China equipped with 
advanced European weapons. A scenario where US soldiers are killed by European 
weaponry purchased by China is unacceptable for Washington and it is mainly for 
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these potential consequences that the US strongly opposes the EU’s arms embargo 
removal (Wai 2011: 200, 202).  
 
 
8.2.3 The embargo today- an outdated impediment at the EU’s expense? 
 
The EU member states’ inability to reach consensus on the Chinese arms embargo 
issue has left the question untouched until this day. However, continuous discussions 
regarding a lift are conducted raising new voices and opinions. In December 2010, 
Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, and the Vice President of the European Commission, released an EU 
strategy paper where she recommends the EU leaders to drop the arms embargo on 
China as a way to improve relations with Beijing and remain on the world stage. She 
referred to the embargo as “a major impediment for developing stronger EU-China co-
operation on foreign policy and security matters” and further admitted “China will not 
match EU standards of human rights and rule of law for some time to come. Future 
convergence is best sought by concentrating on common ground” 
(euobserver.com/ashton, eubusiness.com). This pragmatic statement by HR Ashton 
can easily be interpreted as a change in the EU’s approach to promote human rights in 
China. Even though the paper stresses the importance of working for the release of 
political prisoners in China through diplomatic measures, it also gives impetus to the 
member states that advocate for a lift and creates headwind for the opponents.  
 
Another fine detail in HR Ashton’s strategy paper is the bold description of China as a 
“major world power”. In contrast, Russia is termed a “key player”, which is a 
significantly lower diplomatic designation. Russia is also depicted as dependent on EU 
technology for petrol industrial modernisation purposes, which the EU can use as 
“issue-based leverage” for pushing for democratic and human rights improvements. 
Interestingly enough, the paper makes no such referrals to China 
(euobserver.com/ashton).  
 
China has persistently urged the EU to remove the arms embargo, but has recently 
taken a new strategic approach on the issue. In 2010, China’s ambassador to the EU 
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stated that the arms embargo only triggers China to develop its own arms faster, and “at 
the end of the day, it is the [arms] companies in Europe that are losing out” (Ibid.). 
This statement not only dilutes the purpose of the EU arms embargo, but also 
pressures the EU to revalue the purpose and effect of the embargo and the costs that an 
upholding of the ban could inflict on the European economy and companies in a time 
characterised by crisis. HR Ashton’s strategy paper thus becomes less startling from this 
point of view. 
 
Despite HR Ashton’s alignment with the anti-embargo member states, a lift of the ban 
was yet again down-voted. The Nobel Committee’s recognition of the Chinese dissident 
Liu Xiaobo and China’s aggressive response to this reminded many EU member states 
why the arms embargo was once enacted. However, China’s reaction against the Peace 
Prize was not only directed towards the Nobel Committee but mainly towards the EU 
member states’ embassies in Oslo that were urged to boycott the gala or face 
“consequences”. These alleged consequences could very probably be economic as 
China, during the same period as the announcement of the Peace Prize, promised to 
support Spain, Greece and Portugal’s ailing economies by buying large amounts of their 
government bonds (euobserver.com/bonds).  
 
The EU’s historical and present internal commotion regarding the embargo lift 
demonstrates how fragile and sensitive the question really is and how the situation has 
changed through time. China’s rapid economic growth and the EU’s critical economic 
situation have further bolstered parts of the EU’s conviction in removing the ban and 
given China more leeway in its negotiations with the EU. However, despite how this 
situation has transformed during the past decade, and despite China’s continuous plea 
to lift the arms embargo, it is yet formally in effect, even if single EU member states 
informally continue to provide non-lethal military material to China.  
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8.3 China’s strive for a Market Economy Status 
 
 
8.3.1 How it all began 
 
China has during the past two decades transformed into a global economic power and 
is today recognised as the second largest economy in the world after the US. However, 
China’s road to economic prosperity has been rather long and at times thorny. The 
Tiananmen incident led to both economic and military sanctions, among others, on 
China and interrupted the steady bilateral developments between the EU and China. 
Their bilateral economic relationship began to recover during 1995 based on the EU’s 
release of a new concrete policy toward China. China’s economic transition and trade 
liberalisation created vast economic opportunities for the EU and closer economic 
relationship thus became a European priority (Qingjiang 2012: 3-4). For China, closer 
economic ties with the West signalled increased economic growth and a step closer to a 
WTO accession, which would place China on an equal playing level as other actors and 
thus eliminate international trade discrimination measures contra China 
(economist.com/mes).  
 
 
8.3.2 Granting China MES- the EU’s disservice to self 
 
A WTO accession would allow China to experience greater market access and ability 
to enjoy the same trade related rights as the other WTO member states. China would 
also be much closer in its quest towards a market economy status, which would enable 
a more open and competitive based trade in foreign markets, such as the EU market. A 
Chinese WTO membership also obliged China to reduce its import tax and remove 
trade barriers, for stimulating the opening of the Chinese markets for other actors. This 
was one of the reasons why the EU decided to support China’s WTO accession. It was 
a beneficial opportunity for the EU to gain greater access to Chinese markets and thus 
reduce its growing trade deficit with China. However, when China finally was granted a 
WTO accession in 2001, some of the non-trade barriers remained and are still today 
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preventing EU companies from entering the Chinese market (Men 2012: 342). As a 
result, the EU’s trade deficit vis-à-vis China is increasing instead of decreasing as the EU 
was initially expecting. The EU’s eagerness in reducing the trade deficit with China is 
based on the consequences that a long-term trade deficit inflicts, such as reduced GDP, 
and increased debts and unemployment rates. It also leads to an unstable economy and 
triggers repercussions during a recession (economywatch.com/tradedeficit). For the EU, 
these are serious concerns that threaten the European economy and could be avoided 
if China would allow greater access to its markets. These are some of the issues that the 
EU wants to resolve before granting China MES at an earlier stage than what the WTO 
has decided upon.  
 
The EU would face several implications if it would acknowledge China as a market 
economy. First, the price benchmark to which the Chinese exports are compared to 
would shift. Currently, Chinese export prices are compared to other low-cost exporters 
to detect if China is excessively dumping cheap goods. By becoming a market 
economy, the price comparison would change to China’s domestic prices, which would 
mean that fewer products would pass the dumping grade since Chinese domestic prices 
initially are very low. Hence, the EU would not be able to take anti-dumping measures 
against China to the extent that it does today (euobserver.com/dumping). Since Chinese 
production prices are low and the price of trade goods are among the cheapest in the 
world, a free trade regime would ease the massive inflow of cheap Chinese products to 
compete with more expensive European manufacturers. This in turn would devastate 
the affected European industries and replace them with Chinese imports (Wai 2011: 
194). If China receives MES it would generate great disadvantage for European 
companies and yield tremendous trade possibilities for Chinese manufacturers and 
products.  
 
It is thus the EU’s and China’s different levels of development and competitive 
advantage in trade that creates trade conflicts and insecurity and results in protectionist 
measures. The expectations that both parties had on each other prior to China’s WTO 
accession, China in terms of MES recognition and the EU in terms of easier access to 
the Chinese market and reduction of trade imbalances, have hampered their bilateral 
trade relations and given rise to a need to “retain” trade in sectors that are vulnerable 
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for foreign competition (Wai 2011: 195). These issues are the main problem areas in 
the EU’s and China’s bilateral trade relationship.  
 
 
8.3.3 China’s MES- Europe’s cul-de-sac? 
 
Despite years of consultations and negotiations for solving the trade disputes between 
the EU and China, the situation remains unaltered. The EU is resisting giving China 
MES recognition and is continuously complaining over the trade barriers and its 
increasing trade deficit with China. China’s counter argument is that the EU will 
decrease its trade deficit once it relaxes its import restrictions on high-tech products to 
China and acknowledges China as a market economy (Men 2012: 342).   
 
With the culmination of the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the tension between the EU 
and China regarding the trade disputes has increased. However, despite of the 
continuous “deadlock” in solving the disputes, the EU’s sovereign debt crisis has 
enabled China to use the EU member states’ substandard economic situation as 
leverage for pushing the EU for MES recognition. EU member states such as Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy have reached out to China as a potential buyer of their debt, 
which in turn has enabled China to demand favours in exchange, such as MES 
(telegraph.co.uk/finance). Indeed, China has openly offered to help the euro by 
expanding their European investments, bailing out collapsing member states, and 
buying European bonds and member states’ debts. However, the price that the EU 
would have to pay for a Chinese helping hand could indeed be higher than not 
accepting any help from China at all. If the EU takes China’s offer and allows larger 
inflows of cheap Chinese goods to Europe, the price competitiveness of European 
manufacturers would be undermined, which in turn would lead to more European 
companies going bankrupt for the cost of increased Chinese sales to Europe. This can 
most probably explain why the EU has yet today persevered in granting China a market 
economy status.  
 
China has expressed its willingness to help the EU with its sovereign debt problems and 
has also openly signalled that it wants EU’s MES recognition in return. In September 
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2011, China’s former Premier Wen Jiabao offered a helping hand to troubled 
European member states but added “If EU nations can demonstrate their sincerity 
several years earlier [than WTO’s recognition of China as a market economy in 2016], 
it would be the way a friend treats a friend” (euobserver.com/MES). This implies that 
China is expecting the EU to acknowledge China as a market economy prior to 2016 as 
a friendly gesture for receiving financial help from China.  
 
Despite China’s many efforts to exert pressure on the EU for recognising China as a 
market economy, the EU has not yet yielded to its demands and offers and is 
continuously insisting on China’s compliance on removing trade barriers and opening 
up its markets. However, as time passes, the leverage that the EU is exercising on China 
for opening up its markets for foreign companies in exchange for MES is shrinking. 
China has been urging the EU to grant it a market economy status since 2001 without 
success, and China now only has to wait for another three years in order to receive it by 
the WTO. This implies that if the trade “deadlock” between the EU and China persists 
until 2016, China will receive its anticipated market economy status regardless of the 
EU’s demands on China to further open its markets. This would exacerbate the EU’s 
trade situation with China since the EU would remain on status quo, meaning that the 
European companies would not enjoy greater access to Chinese markets, while Chinese 
products would have free inflow to the European market.  
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9. Analysis of the EU-China Interdependent 
Economic Relationship and Cases 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been divided into two parts in order to make it as structured as 
possible for the reader. The first part intends to analyse the general development of the 
EU-China interdependent economic relationship to see what changes that have taken 
place until the financial crisis in order to identify if the relationship has become more 
asymmetrical or not. The second part of this chapter will further elaborate on the 
analytical findings from the case perspectives. This means that the findings from the 
first part will constitute the basis for the analysis on each of the cases. My aim with this 
section is to examine how the financial crisis has affected the EU-China interdependent 
economic relationship and thus the three bilateral cases by applying the theoretical 
instruments of power, vulnerability and cost perspective.  
 
 
9.1 Part I: General analysis of the EU-China interdependent 
economic relationship  
 
What we have seen thus far is that the EU and China have come a long way in the 
development of their interdependent economic relationship. Both have acknowledged 
the benefits in strengthening their bilateral ties and are actively pursuing and adhering to 
common strategies and goals for achieving a fruitful and more advantageous 
relationship. However, despite their mutually beneficial intentions, economic factors 
have led to disruptions and tensions between the EU and China on several issues, 
which in turn have affected the level of symmetry of their interdependent economic 
relationship.  
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9.1.1 Status quo: asymmetrical interdependence favouring the EU 
 
When the EU-China bilateral trade relationship really began to soar during the second 
part of the 1990s, their relationship benefits outshined both actors’ differences. China’s 
economy was on the upswing, but it needed the EU’s markets and expertise in capital-
intensive and technology-intensive products to further bolster the Chinese economy. 
The EU, on the other hand, saw immense trade opportunities in China that could yield 
much needed investments and revive the stagnant growth rate that Europe was facing 
during the 1990s. However, from an economic interdependence point of view, one can 
correctly assume that China was more dependent on the EU during that time since it 
was not yet a WTO-member and also in need of the European market and knowledge 
for expanding further. For these reasons, China needed to show the international 
community that it was a compliant and mature actor that needed to be taken seriously. 
This could explain why China agreed to engage in bilateral HR Dialogues with the EU, 
even though it views these issues as strictly national concerns. In accordance with the 
concept of power, the EU used the sources of power that China’s more economically 
dependent situation gave rise to and managed to enact the HR Dialogues. This was the 
price that China had to pay, i.e. the cost, for establishing closer ties with the EU that 
would eventually yield further economic prosperity for China. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that the EU was not dependent on China for economic reasons. Both actors 
had much to win from enhanced cooperation, but at the initial stage, China had more at 
stake by not complying with the EU’s requests. Thus from this perspective, we can 
conclude that the interdependent relationship between the actors was initially 
asymmetrical to the EU’s favour.  
 
 
9.1.2 Shift in trade dependency and power asymmetry to China’s favour 
 
With China’s WTO accession and strong economic advancement in the beginning of 
the 21st century, the asymmetrical interdependent economic relationship between the 
EU and China began to shift. The EU’s expectations in gaining greater access to 
China’s markets were not entirely fulfilled by China’s WTO accession. The accession 
opened up the Chinese market, but not to the extent that the EU had expected. 
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Instead, China’s competitive advantage began to expand to high-end and value added 
products, which are the EU’s main export competences. This did not only lead to 
increased protectionism, but also to a shift in trade dependency between the EU and 
China. European companies were not given full access to Chinese markets, which led 
to great economic losses for the EU; the production capabilities shifted which limited 
the EU’s competitive advantage in high-technological products; and the EU’s trade 
deficit with China continued to grow. These issues strongly influenced the division of 
power and symmetry in the EU-China interdependent economic relationship to shift to 
China’s favour. The EU became more vulnerable since the changes that took place in 
the EU-China economic policy framework inferred greater costly effects on the EU 
than on China, even if China is affected by the EU’s increased protectionism. 
Furthermore, China’s economic advantage and the European member’s economic 
hardship enabled China to apply the carrot and stick measure against individual 
member states. China uses its ability to reward or withdraw profitable orders to 
European states depending on their actions. At this stage, the situation became reverse 
since it now was the EU member states that had more at stake economically by not 
complying with China’s requests.  
 
From a trade point of view, China is dependent on the EU since it is China’s greatest 
export market. However, the power that the EU has in this respect is hard to use as 
leverage on China. If the EU would take drastic protectionist measures and close the 
European market for Chinese products to force China to open its markets for 
European companies, it would invoke devastating consequences not only for China, but 
also for the EU. The costliness for the EU would be much higher import prices since 
the substitute alternatives for Chinese products are few, both from a quantity and price 
perspective. Options such as India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia could be matching 
substitutes in terms of price, but it would take time for these states to produce the same 
quantities as China. For China, there would be short-term consequences. China would 
lose its most important export market, but would be able to maintain, or maybe even 
increase its exports to other parts of the world. China’s low production prices, broad 
market, and cheap workforce give it a competitive advantage in practically all markets. 
This illustrates that the EU is much more vulnerable to any changes in its trade policy 
with China, since it would infer much higher costs for the EU than for China.  
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9.1.3 Financial crisis: A stronger China versus an even weaker EU 
 
The effects of the financial crisis have further exacerbated the economic power 
asymmetry in the EU-China interdependent economic relationship. The economic 
advantage that China enjoys vis-à-vis the EU has increased in line with the EU’s 
sovereign debt crisis, which has created opportunities for China to exercise a tougher 
bargaining line against a more economically desperate Union. From a power 
perspective, China has become more assertive and less willing to compromise on trade 
issues. China’s willingness to help the EU financially comes with official requests for 
MES and a removal of the arms embargo, among other things. If the EU would decide 
to meet China’s requests, it would not only make the EU more dependent on China, 
but it would also leave the EU without any political leverage against China. Thus, the 
costliness of accepting financial help from China is very high and could have severe 
long-term implications on the EU-China bilateral relationship if the EU would decide 
to remove the arms embargo and grant MES to China. The EU has thus far been 
cautious in accepting China’s help. However, the help that the EU member states have 
received in terms of investments and purchasing of government bonds has created 
internal discussions within the EU, where the member states that are receiving Chinese 
financial help are proclaiming to remove the arms embargo. This has contributed to 
increased asymmetry in the EU-China bilateral relationship to China’s favour. China 
now pays less attention to the EU’s demands and has begun to make demands on its 
own by, for example, taking the sudden decision not to participate in the second round 
of the HR Dialogues. 
 
Due to the EU-China interdependent economic relationship, the EU’s sovereign debt 
crisis can impose negative reciprocal effects on China as well. If the EU member states’ 
purchasing power drops, the EU will not be able to maintain its import levels, which 
would primarily affect China as the EU’s largest exporter. It is therefore in China’s 
interest to keep the EU from collapsing, since China’s profits depend on their 
interdependent economic relationship. From this point of view, the EU can manage to 
accept some economic help from China without having to promise favours in return. 
However, if the EU would become much more economically dependent on Chinese 
help, then China would have a higher demand on the EU to meet China’s requests. 
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9.2 Part II: Analysis of the cases 
 
 
9.2.1 HR Dialogues- A losing game for the EU 
 
Compared to the other two cases, the HR Dialogues is the case that has experienced 
the most radical changes in the EU-China interdependent relationship with the financial 
crisis. Being initially an initiative by the EU to promote the importance of human rights 
in China during China’s transition into an economic power, it has become a secondary 
issue with little effect on China.  
 
The only incentive for China to engage in HR Dialogues with the EU was to improve its 
image as a responsible and reasonable actor during a time when China was more 
dependent on the EU than vice versa. The costliness for China to engage in the 
dialogues was low for what it was worth; establishing closer relations with the EU, which 
in turn would contribute to further economic prosperity for China. The reciprocal 
costly effects of the dialogues were thus beneficial for both actors; the EU was satisfied 
that China decided to meet the EU’s human rights demands, and China was satisfied 
with establishing closer bilateral relations. 
 
However, in line with China’s economic prosperity and the EU’s economic crisis, 
China’s incentive for upholding the dialogues with the EU disappeared. China became 
less dependent on meeting the EU’s requests, while the EU’s economic dependency on 
China increased. This allowed China to decide that it no longer wanted to participate in 
one of the two annual human rights meetings. This is a clear indication of a shift in 
power asymmetry between the EU and China. Furthermore, it illustrates that there are 
no extreme costly effects for China when it refuses to attend one of the annual 
meetings. One consequence of China’s actions in this case is that it can create fractures 
in China’s political relations with the EU. It can also complicate the removal of the 
arms embargo, which is maybe the most important cost that China’s action imposes. 
However, if China manages to produce own high-technological military material, it 
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would demote the importance of the embargo for China and thus also reduce the cost 
of refusing to take part of the HR Dialogues.  
 
The main difference between the HR Dialogues and the arms embargo is that the EU 
cannot use the dialogues as leverage on China for requesting human rights 
improvements in return. The reason why the EU argues that the dialogues have 
generated poor results can to a large extent depend on the fact that China no longer has 
an incentive in upholding the dialogues. 
 
Furthermore, the economic power asymmetry has allowed China to issue economic 
consequences on the EU and its member states for arranging meetings with the Dalai 
Lama. Since issues such as Tibet and the Dalai Lama are considered strictly national 
interests, China has begun to penalise the EU by cancelling bilateral summits about the 
trade imbalance and other crisis related issues. This is a clear example of China taking 
advantage of the economic asymmetries as means of power for preventing meetings 
between the EU and the Dalai Lama. In this respect, the costs of conducting meetings 
with the Dalai Lama become very high for the EU, since the EU is in need of China to 
open its markets in order to solve the trade imbalance issue. 
 
 
9.2.2 Arms embargo- From HR commitment to a stone in the shoe  
 
By analysing the arms embargo from a cost perspective we can identify a clear shift in 
costly effects of the EU’s arms embargo lift prior compared to after the financial crisis. 
Prior to the crisis, the EU believed that the arms embargo was needed as an incentive 
for demanding improved human rights in China and an upholding of the embargo was 
therefore prioritised before the economic gains that a lift would have generated. A 
removal without any signs of human rights improvement in China could have been 
interpreted as a failure of the EU’s human rights commitment and an easy recognition 
of China’s demanding power. The voting polls by the European Parliament and the 
member states against a lift confirmed the importance of keeping the embargo in place 
even if internal disagreements remained.  
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However, with the outbreak of the financial crisis and the EU’s disappointment on 
China’s human rights improvements, the costly effects in upholding the embargo have 
increased. Not only have the discussions regarding a lift continued, but they have also 
begun to involve higher instances within the EU, which has added further pressure on 
the issue. The recommendation of HR Ashton’s strategy paper to drop the embargo 
has shed new light on the EU’s changing opinion. On the one hand the strategy paper 
signals that the embargo is no longer serving its purpose as an incentive for China to 
improve its human rights situation and should therefore be lifted. One the other hand, 
the embargo has become a stone in the shoe for the EU-China relations. The embargo 
has not only undermined its purpose, but it is also hampering the EU’s development of 
stronger bilateral ties with China. The strategy paper realises that the maintenance of a 
no longer efficient statement such as the arms embargo has both political and economic 
implications for the EU in its relations with China, and since it is no longer serving its 
purpose, the costs of keeping the embargo are higher than lifting it.  
 
Yet, HR Ashton’s paper has not yielded any significant changes on the issue since the 
embargo still remains today. According to the concept of power in interdependency 
theory, a powerful actor could influence another actor to do something against its will 
for a reasonable cost or by offering options. In the arms embargo case, China has 
indeed intended to persuade individual member states to push for a lift in exchange for 
financial help and lucrative contracts. Even if certain member states have captured the 
bait, others have declined, which implies that these options are not convincing enough 
for all. Some member states’ conviction of retaining the embargo has rather been 
strengthened due to China’s recent reactions on human rights issues, such as its 
condemnation of Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize nomination.  
 
When related to vulnerability in interdependency theory, the implementation of EU’s 
arms embargo forced China to purchase military material and technology from other 
suppliers. The inferred cost that the embargo placed on China was that China had to 
adjust to arms policies of other states that are not as advanced as the European material, 
but yet substitute alternatives. The changing of the arms policy framework thus showed 
that China is not extremely vulnerable to the EU’s embargo even if it infers costs on 
China in terms of modern and high-technological material that China cannot attain 
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from its current suppliers. Furthermore, in line with its economic prosperity, China has 
the means to invest in and develop its own high-technological material, which would 
make China even less vulnerable to the EU arms embargo. However, the restrictions of 
the embargo has placed China in a disadvantageous and more vulnerable position since 
it imposes extra costs on China for acquiring less advanced material from fewer 
suppliers.   
 
 
9.2.3 Market Economy Status- the EU’s leverage until 2016 
 
What we have seen thus far based on the other two cases is that China’s economic 
prosperity has enabled it to put the EU in a more imbalanced bilateral position by 
exerting economic pressure on the EU. However, the interesting point of the MES case 
is that the financial crisis or China’s economic power has not affected the EU’s position 
in granting MES to China. Despite the asymmetrical trade and economic imbalance 
between China and the EU, the EU has not yielded to China’s pressure for MES 
recognition. From a power perspective, this is an interesting aspect since China has 
expressively expected MES in return for helping EU member states economically. One 
explanation to the EU’s steadfast position could be that the reciprocal costly effects are 
very uneven for the EU and China in this case. If China receives MES it would enable 
an easier inflow of cheap Chinese products to European markets. However, for the EU 
the costliness of granting China MES is very high since it would make it significantly 
harder for European companies to reach the same level of price competitiveness as the 
Chinese equivalent. Hence, Chinese products would take over a much larger part of the 
European market and leave the European companies worse-off. 
 
Another important aspect is that the EU has urged China to open up its markets for 
foreign companies as a way to decrease its trade deficit with China. However, China is 
demanding MES before opening up its markets, which has given rise to a deadlock. 
This has enabled the EU to use China’s strive for MES as leverage for demanding 
China to open markets and remove trade barriers. The costliness for China to open up 
its markets is not extremely high, but it is a cost that China would not have to pay in 
2016 when it will be recognised as a market economy by the WTO.  
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Therefore, even if China is in a vulnerable position, its vulnerability is diminishing with 
time due to the WTO’s decision to recognise China as a market economy by 2016. 
This means that as time elapses, China becomes less dependent on the EU in receiving 
MES. The EU’s position against MES will continue to hamper China’s economic 
progression until 2016, but from there and on, the EU will lose its MES leverage on 
China and China will not have had to meet the EU’s demands for more open markets. 
If this situation occurs, the economic power asymmetry will become even greater 
between the EU and China, and it will have considerable impact on the EU’s overall 
power capacity towards China.  
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10. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
For facilitating the conclusion of what has been stated hitherto, it could be convenient 
to primarily restate the initial research question of this paper before proceeding:  
 
What implications has the financial crisis posed on the EU-China interdependent 
economic relationship and what consequences has this, in turn, had on the bilateral 
issues that are the HR Dialogues, the EU arms embargo on China, and China’s strive 
for MES recognition by the EU? Has there been an economic power shift between the 
two actors due to the crisis? Has the financial crisis made their bilateral relationship 
more asymmetrical in terms of power within these three areas? Can we perhaps assume 
that these three areas have not been affected by the crisis? 
 
From a general perspective, we can conclude that the interdependent economic power 
asymmetry between the EU and China shifted from being somewhat in the EU’s favour 
before China’s WTO accession to be more favourable for China after the WTO 
accession. This means that the initial shift in power asymmetry between the EU and 
China emanated already before the financial crisis. Hence, it is not the crisis that has 
given rise to this shift, but it has however further exacerbated the level of power 
asymmetry between the two actors. The financial crisis has not only made China more 
assertive on the international arena, but it is also showing a much tougher bargaining 
line towards the EU with higher demands and much less space for compromise than 
before the crisis. The EU’s deteriorating economic situation due to the crisis has 
enabled China to use its economic strength by offering financial help to exposed 
member states in exchange for high demands such as MES and lifting the arms 
embargo. 
 
This takes us to conclude upon the three cases by using the theoretical instruments, 
cost, power and vulnerability, derived from the interdependency theory. To conclude 
upon the HR Dialogues we can state that the financial crisis has made the EU-China 
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bilateral relationship extremely asymmetrical within this case. Out of the three 
examined cases, the HR Dialogues is the one that has experienced the most palpable 
and drastic changes. Initially, China had much to gain by accepting to take part of the 
HR Dialogues with the EU since the EU-China interdependent economic relationship 
was more asymmetric to the EU’s favour. However, with China’s economic prosperity 
and the EU’s economic crisis situation, China no longer has an incentive in continuing 
with the dialogues and can afford to decline taking part in discussing issues that are 
considered as strictly national matters. The reason why China abruptly decided not to 
attend one of the two annual HR Dialogue meetings was because the cost of not 
participating was very low. The EU cannot use this issue as leverage on China and 
China does not have any incentive to uphold the dialogue. In sum, the only reason for 
China’s participation in the dialogues in the first case was because the EU demanded it 
in order to strengthen their bilateral cooperation. However, with the financial crisis and 
the previous shift in economic power symmetry to China’s favour, China has grown in 
economic power and can manage the cost of not having to adhere to the EU’s demands 
anymore. This is a clear signal that the EU-China bilateral relationship has become 
extremely asymmetrical in this case due to China’s economic prosperity and the EU’s 
economic hardship as a result of the financial crisis. 
 
In the arms embargo case, we can identify important changes prior and after the crisis. 
The financial crisis has made it more costly for the EU to uphold the arms embargo on 
China, not only from an economic and trade perspective, but also since it hampers the 
strengthening of bilateral ties between the EU and China. It has also made the EU 
realise that the embargo will not serve its initial purpose, which was to encourage China 
to improve its human rights situation. This can be seen in Catherine Ashton’s pragmatic 
approach in her strategy paper. Instead, there are reports that the human rights 
situation has deteriorated in China, which furthermore questions the purpose of 
upholding the embargo.  
 
From a vulnerability and power perspective, we can conclude that the financial crisis 
has empowered China to use the EU member states’ debt crisis as leverage for lifting 
the embargo in exchange for financial support. However, even if China has managed to 
persuade individual member states to vote for a removal of the embargo, it has not yet 
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yielded any effect since the embargo is still in place. China used to be the vulnerable 
part in this case prior to the crisis since it was in need of advanced European military 
technology for enhancing its own military equipment. However, I argue that the 
financial crisis has shifted the vulnerability to affect the EU more than China. China’s 
economic prosperity has enabled it to focus more on developing its own military 
technology, which in turn makes China less vulnerable to the EU’s embargo. If China 
develops advanced military technology, it would mean that the necessity for European 
military products would decrease and the EU would lose a substantial amount of cash 
inflow in a time already characterised by crisis. The financial crisis has made the issue 
more urgent for the EU and has thus left the EU in a more vulnerable position than 
before the crisis. Based on the above, we can conclude that the financial crisis has made 
the arms embargo case more asymmetrical to China’s favour.  
 
The impact of the financial crisis and China’s economic prosperity has, in contrast to 
the previously mentioned cases, not posed any great consequences upon the MES case. 
Even if the economic power asymmetries have changed between the EU and China in 
general, it has not generated any significant effects on the MES case. This is a rather 
remarkable discovery since it proves that the MES case is more resilient to 
asymmetrical power changes within the EU-China interdependent economic 
relationship. 
 
From a cost perspective we can conclude that the financial crisis has made it more 
costly for the EU to recognise China as a market economy. A MES would impose 
additional economical challenges for the already struggling European companies and 
would very probably increase the EU’s trade deficit with China. The EU has therefore 
no cost incentive in granting China MES before 2016. From a economic power 
perspective we can conclude that the financial crisis has empowered China to demand 
MES in exchange for providing economic support to individual member states. 
However, the costly effects for the EU are much higher in granting China MES than 
not receiving economic support from China, which is why China’s demand has not 
yielded any results. From a vulnerability perspective we can conclude that China has 
become less vulnerable in the MES case, however, this is not due to the financial crisis, 
but rather due to the elapsing of time. The closer we get to 2016, the less vulnerable 
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China becomes to the EU’s refusal to grant China as a market economy. Hence, based 
on the above mentioned, we can conclude that the financial crisis has not made the EU-
China bilateral relationship more asymmetrical within the MES case.  
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Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
Research Problem and Aim 
 
The bilateral relationship between the EU and China has during the last decades given 
rise to numerous debates and analyses from a domestic, institutional, societal, or 
international perspective. However, I have not yet encountered a study that analyses the 
effects of the financial crisis on the EU-China interdependent economic relationship. 
What implications has the financial crisis had on the EU-China interdependent 
relationship and how have these effects, in turn, affected the EU arms embargo on 
China, the Human Rights Dialogues, and China’s strive for MES recognition by the 
EU? Has the financial crisis made their bilateral relationship more asymmetrical within 
these three cases? Is it possible to assume that the financial crisis has not affected these 
three areas of analysis?  
 
My aim is thus to analyse if there has been a power shift in economic terms between the 
actors due to the financial crisis, and if so, to see how this has been reflected within the 
three specific cases.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The intention of this paper is to carry out a case study of three cases. The method that 
will be applied is the method of structured, focused comparison. The analytical frame 
of this study is the EU-China interdependent economic relationship and the cases that 
are subject for investigation are the EU-China Human Rights Dialogues, the EU’s arms 
embargo on China, and China’s strive for MES recognition by the EU. 
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The “structured” part of the method is characterised by the fact that it uses a number of 
questions that reflect the research objective. These consist of my previously presented 
research questions presented. These questions are thus applied on each investigated 
case, which enables a comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases and 
makes the method more “focused”.  
 
This paper will focus on how the financial crisis has affected the EU-China 
interdependent economic relationship, to see how this in turn has affected their power 
relations within the three specific bilateral cases. The scope conditions derived from 
interdependency theory are costly effects, power, and vulnerability. These conditions 
will be applied as instruments for investigating the cases to see how the effects of the 
financial crisis have changed these.   
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The basic idea of interdependency theory is that it can be used for making political 
analysis of the level of interdependence between states/actors. It is characterised by 
reciprocal events among states/actors and can be defined simply as mutual dependence. 
The scope conditions derived from interdependency theory are costly effects, power, 
and vulnerability. These conditions are applied as analytical tools for investigating the 
cases in the analysis of this paper.  
 
Moreover, the concept of interdependent asymmetry is also deployed in this paper. 
Asymmetries create space for advantages and sources of influence for actors such as the 
EU or China that are engaged in a complex interdependent relationship.  
 
 
Empirical Material 
 
The empirical material is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the 
development of the EU-China interdependent economic relationship and illustrates the 
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characteristics of the relationship. It further elaborates on the EU-China trade relations 
and highlights the benefits, setbacks, threats, and weaknesses of the trade relationship. 
This information further moves on to a section that employs the effects of the financial 
crisis on the EU-China trade relations. The second part outlines the information of the 
three main cases in this paper. It provides information about the background, historical 
development, and the development during the financial crisis of each case. This is done 
to facilitate the understanding of how the cases have evolved between the EU and 
China.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis is, alike the empirical section, also divided into two parts. The first part 
analyses the general development of the EU-China interdependent relationship to 
identify how the symmetry within their interdependent relationship has developed and 
changed, and if there has been any shift in dependency between the two actors. This is 
performed by applying the scope conditions of costly effect, power, and vulnerability, 
derived from interdependency theory. The second part of the analysis undertakes each 
of the cases’ developments during the financial crisis and applies the same theoretical 
scope conditions on each case to identify what shifts or changes that have taken place.  
 
 
Main Conclusion 
 
The conclusion of the first part of the analysis indicates that the EU-China 
interdependent economic relationship was initially asymmetrical to the EU’s favour. 
However, China’s WTO accession shifted this asymmetry to China’s favour. It was thus 
not the effects of the financial crisis that gave rise to this shift. However, the financial 
crisis has further exacerbated the power asymmetries within the EU-China 
interdependent economic relationship.  
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The conclusion based on the analysis of each case demonstrates different results. The 
main conclusion on the HR Dialogues is that the financial crisis ha made the EU-China 
interdependent relationship extremely asymmetrical within this case. The HR 
Dialogues case is the one that has experienced the most dramatic change compared to 
the other two cases. China’s economic prosperity and the EU’s sovereign debt crisis has 
exacerbated the level of asymmetry within the EU-China bilateral relationship in this 
case since China no longer has any incentive in upholding the two annual dialogues and 
has openly demonstrated this by only attending one annual meeting. 
 
The arms embargo has become more expensive to uphold for the EU due to the 
financial crisis. China is no longer as vulnerable as before against the arms embargo, 
instead it is the EU who has become vulnerable in this issue. The main conclusion is 
that the financial crisis has made the arms embargo case more asymmetrical, even 
tough it is still in effect.  
 
In contrast to the above-mentioned case findings, the main conclusion on the MES case 
is that the financial crisis has not made the case more asymmetrical. However, from the 
EU’s perspective, the financial crisis has imposed a higher cost on recognising China as 
a market economy. From China’s perspective, time is making China less vulnerable to 
the EU’s refusal to grant it MES. Despite this, China’s economic prosperity and the 
EU’s economic hardship have, surprisingly enough, not generated any significant effects 
on this case. This illustrates that the MES case is the most resilient out of the three 
examined cases to economic power shifts between the EU and China.  
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